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A Shield Does Not Fall in Hazelwood:  Privileging the Legitimate 
Journalism of High School Student Reporters 
June M. Hu* 
INTRODUCTION 
After fifteen-year-old Audrie Pott hanged herself, student reporters on her high 
school’s newspaper began investigating the circumstances leading up to the 
tragedy.1  The newspaper staff at Saratoga High School conducted over fifty 
interviews regarding Audrie’s sexual assault and the photos of her attack that 
classmates had circulated before her suicide.2  After weeks of research, three 
reporters published their findings on April 14, 2013, in an article involving five 
anonymous student sources.3  In August, when the three student reporters went 
back to school for the first day of a new academic year, they found subpoenas 
waiting for them.4  The subpoenas required them to name the confidential sources 
in their article.5  The reporters chose to protect the names of their confidential 
student sources,6 for whom exposure could carry harsh social, disciplinary and 
legal ramifications.7 
The Saratoga High School student reporters argued that they had a “reporter’s 
 
 *  Columbia Law School, J.D., 2015.  My thanks to Professors Craig Levine and Vincent Blasi 
for their guidance; to my editors, especially Renee Stern, Mea Lewis and Joseph Kay, for their advice; 
and to the student journalists who helped me understand the hard work and important contributions of a 
robust student press. 
 1. Reports:  3 Teens Admit Assaulting NorCal Girl Who Later Killed Herself, CBSNEWS (Jan. 
16, 2014, 5:27 AM), http://perma.cc/UKX4-A56A. 
 2. Natasha Vargas-Cooper, A Party, a Sexual Assault, and a Suicide:  Was 15-Year-Old Audrie 
Pott Cyberbullied to Death?, BUZZFEED (May 24, 2013, 10:46 AM), http://perma.cc/T9TW-BL77. 
 3. Sabrina Chen, Cristina Curcelli & Samuel Liu, Sources Say that “Around 10 Students” Saw 
Illicit Photos of Audrie Pott, SARATOGA FALCON, Apr. 14, 2013, http://perma.cc/6AEU-63GQ. 
 4. To make matters worse for the student reporters, they did not personally receive the 
subpoenas until the first day of the fall semester—the day that compliance was due—because the 
subpoenas were sent to the school.  Telephone Interview with Frank LoMonte, Exec. Dir., Student Press 
Law Ctr., at 22:27–26:55 (Nov. 7, 2013) [hereinafter Telephone Interview with Frank LoMonte].  The 
Student Press Law Center advises student reporters and school newspapers on their legal rights, and 
represented the Saratoga High School student reporters when they received their subpoenas in August 
2013. Id. at 24:30–24:56. 
 5. Natasha Vargas-Cooper, High School Journalists Successfully Test Shield Law in 
Cyberbullying Suicide Case, BUZZFEED (Aug. 29, 2013, 8:18 PM), http://perma.cc/8GP2-G8UN. 
 6. Id. (quoting one of the reporters, who said that he and his colleagues did not want to “destroy 
[their] journalistic integrity by giving up [their] confidential sources”).  
 7. The Student Press Law Center has found that high school student reporters need to give out 
promises of anonymity much more frequently than their professional counterparts, in light of concerns 
about school disciplinary actions or psychologically damaging social ostracism.  Telephone Interview 
with Frank LoMonte, supra note 4, at 22:27–26:55.  
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privilege” based in the First Amendment and state statutes.8  When applicable, the 
reporter’s privilege shields journalists from compelled disclosure of sources and 
notes.9  So far, only a handful of district courts have considered the availability or 
strength of a reporter’s privilege for student reporters, and none have looked at the 
reporter’s privilege in the context of high school student reporters.10  Robert Allard, 
the lawyer who requested the subpoenas, has withdrawn them for now, so the 
reporter’s privilege issue was not adjudicated.11  Despite the lack of case law, the 
reporter’s privilege is a relevant issue for high school student reporters.  Between 
four to six college students each year receive subpoenas for their work on student 
newspapers, and high school student reporters are almost never subpoenaed in 
relation to their newsgathering.12  But when high school student reporters are 
subpoenaed, as the Saratoga High School students’ subpoenas demonstrated, the 
legal and emotional implications are grave.  The Saratoga High School students 
were “scared out of [their] mind[s]” when they received the subpoenas, and 
understandably so.13  High school student reporters, like their professional 
counterparts, can be punished for contempt of court for failure to reveal sources 
pursuant to a subpoena.14  Unlike professional reporters, however, student reporters 
lack the legal and political clout to defend themselves.15  Civil or criminal sanctions 
could spell the end of a student reporter’s college and professional dreams.16  Their 
greater vulnerability makes legal protection more imperative for high school 
reporters than for their professional counterparts.17 
 
 8. See Vargas-Cooper, supra note 5. 
 9. The Reporter’s Privilege Compendium:  An Introduction, REPORTERS COMM. FOR FREEDOM 
OF THE PRESS, http://perma.cc/8EEN-F6UX (last visited Oct. 18, 2014) [hereinafter The Reporter’s 
Privilege Compendium]. 
 10. Persky v. Yeshiva Univ., No. 01 Civ. 5278(LMM), 2002 WL 31769704 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 10, 
2002) (applying privilege to undergraduate journalist); Blum v. Schlegel, 150 F.R.D. 42, 43 (W.D.N.Y. 
1993) (applying privilege to law school student). 
 11. See Vargas-Cooper, supra note 5 (“[The Pott family’s lawyer] warned in an email that he and 
the Pott family may revisit the matter after the students graduate in June.”).  
 12. Telephone Interview with Frank LoMonte, supra note 4, at 56:32–56:55. 
 13. Vargas-Cooper, supra note 5 (quoting one of the reporters).  
 14. Minors can be held in contempt absent independent criminal charges.  See Juvenile Contempt 
Cases, Wash. Defender Ass’n, http://perma.cc/SK9W-WGT2 (last visited Oct. 20, 2014).   
 15. See Jeffrey G. Sherman, Comment, Constitutional Protection for the Newsman’s Work 
Product, 6 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 119, 129–30 (1970) (voicing concern that barring the reporter’s 
privilege from all persons except those who work for established news sources overprotects news 
sources that are likely able to defend themselves through political processes). 
 16. Students, by and large, do not enter the courtroom with an impressive professional résumé.  
Judith Miller, the New York Times journalist who was jailed after being found in contempt for refusing 
to disclose a source, already had an illustrious professional career behind her.  See Adam Liptak, 
Reporter Jailed After Refusing to Name Source, N.Y. TIMES, July 7, 2005, at A1.  She continued to 
receive work in journalism after she got out of jail.  Although she retired from the Times and lost some 
of her former credibility, she continued to edit magazines and was hired as a television news 
commentator.  See Biography, JUDITHMILLER.COM, http://perma.cc/A25G-8REK (last visited Nov. 5, 
2014) (describing Miller’s post-New York Times career); Rory O’Connor, Less Credible than Judith 
Miller, ALTERNET (June 5, 2006), http://perma.cc/EH4H-D83U (describing Miller as “the much-
maligned ex-New York Times reporter Judith Miller”). 
 17. Without the reporter’s privilege, student reporters’ lack of experience, combined with the 
above-mentioned legal and educational consequences, see supra note 7, makes them more vulnerable to 
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This Note focuses on the applicability of a First Amendment reporter’s privilege 
for high school student reporters.  In Part I, this Note provides a brief overview of 
the current First Amendment reporter’s privilege jurisprudence.  Most, but not all, 
jurisdictions recognize some form of a First Amendment reporter’s privilege.  
Generally speaking, in jurisdictions that recognize a First Amendment reporter’s 
privilege, judges are much more likely to quash subpoenas for traditional 
newsgatherers—“a person who is a full-time employee of a daily newspaper”18—
than for non-traditional newsgatherers.19 
Parts II and III explore the special circumstances that could jeopardize a high 
school student reporter’s claim to First Amendment privilege.  Two main 
differences between student and traditional press might lead a court to categorically 
exclude student reporters from coverage.  First, the student reporter is not a full-
time employee of the institutional press.  Although many other non-traditional 
newsgatherers have successfully claimed the privilege, courts and lawmakers in 
some jurisdictions have attempted to exclude “leakers” by defining privileged 
persons in ways that could also categorically exclude student journalists.20  Second, 
a student reporter gathers news as part of her high school education.  In the student 
press context, the Supreme Court has used the “educational purpose” argument to 
justify a narrowing of students’ First Amendment protection against pre-publication 
censorship.21 
Parts II and III then argue that high school students should not be categorically 
excluded from a First Amendment reporter’s privilege.  Instead, the First 
Amendment should provide the same reporter’s privilege for a student reporter as it 
would for a professional reporter.  In Part IV, this Note recommends that states 
adopt shield laws that allow students to qualify for journalistic privilege over their 
professional-level news reporting, which would reinforce student reporters’ First 
Amendment protections. 
I.  IS THERE A FIRST AMENDMENT EVIDENTIARY PRIVILEGE FOR 
REPORTERS? 
The First Amendment of the Constitution, as incorporated through the 
Fourteenth Amendment, prohibits the federal and state governments from abridging 
the freedom of the press.22  Government censorship is just one way to undermine a 
 
self-censorship.  See STUDENT PRESS LAW CTR., ENGAGING FOR CHANGE:  ANNUAL REPORT 2012–13, 
at 2 (2013), available at http://perma.cc/4DLY-DJXU.  
 18. 23 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM, JR., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND 
PROCEDURE:  EVIDENCE § 5426 (2013). 
 19. See, e.g., In re Madden, 151 F.3d 125, 130 (3d Cir. 1998) (“As we see it, the privilege is 
available only to those persons whose purposes are those traditionally inherent to the press.”). 
 20. Whether and to what extent the First Amendment protects bloggers is beyond the scope of 
this Note.  For more on the blogger’s privilege, see Ronald D. Coleman, Bloggers, Journalists, 
Reporting, and Privilege, N.Y. ST. B.A. J., Nov./Dec. 2013, at 18.   
 21. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 272–73 (1988). 
 22. U.S. CONST. amend. I; see Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 722–23 (1931) (applying the 
First Amendment Free Press Clause to states).  
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free press:  any commandeering of press resources threatens the freedom of the 
press.23  The trust between journalists and their sources is an invaluable press 
resource.24  Sources give reporters superior access to newsworthy information 
when they trust reporters to exercise journalistic ethics, and, moreover, when they 
trust that the information they give reporters will not be readily available to the 
government.25  Proponents of the reporter’s privilege argue that court-ordered 
disclosures erode the sources’ trust in the press, amplify the journalists’ 
professional risks and reduce the public’s access to information.26 
Recognizing the public interest in an autonomous press but reconciling it with 
individuals’ duty to testify in court, many jurisdictions offer reporters a qualified 
reporter’s privilege,27 based in the First Amendment,28 state shield laws29 or the 
common law.30  Given the importance of the reporter’s privilege to the press’ 
function and independence, a reporter’s privilege based in the First Amendment 
Free Press Clause might seem like a foregone conclusion.31  In reality, some 
 
 23. “[T]he press’ function as a vital source of information is weakened whenever the ability of 
journalists to gather news is impaired.  Compelling a reporter to disclose the identity of a source may 
significantly interfere with this news gathering ability; journalists frequently depend on informants to 
gather news, and confidentiality is often essential to establishing a relationship with an informant.”  
Mitchell v. Superior Court, 690 P.2d 625, 628 (Cal. 1984) (en banc).  
 24. Gonzales v. NBC, 194 F.3d 29, 33–36 (2d Cir. 1999) (finding that “the public policy favoring 
the free flow of information to the public” necessitates especially strong protection of confidential 
sources).  
 25. See MARC A. FRANKLIN ET AL., MASS MEDIA LAW:  CASES AND MATERIALS 465–66 (8th ed. 
2011) (detailing the theoretical underpinnings of a First Amendment reporter’s privilege). 
 26. See, e.g., Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663, 665 (1991) (holding that the First 
Amendment does not bar a plaintiff from recovering damages for a newspaper’s breach of a promise of 
confidentiality given to the plaintiff in exchange for information); see also Gonzales, 194 F.3d at 33, 34 
(although finding a narrower press interest in non-confidential information, emphasizing the “foundation 
of the privilege” is “the public policy favoring the free flow of information to the public”); The 
Reporter’s Privilege Compendium, supra note 9 (arguing the importance of privileging reporters’ 
confidential sources and notes). 
 27. See, e.g., Von Bulow ex rel. Auersperg v. Von Bulow, 811 F.2d 136, 145 (2d Cir. 1987); 
Zerilli v. Smith, 656 F.2d 705, 714 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (finding that a First Amendment reporter’s privilege 
applied unless the subpoenaed information was crucial to the case and could not be obtained from any 
other source). 
 28. After Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972), some federal courts have covered non-
traditional journalists using a federal common law privilege instead of clearly stating that they are 
applying a First Amendment-based privilege.  See, e.g., Blum v. Schlegel, 150 F.R.D. 42, 45 (W.D.N.Y. 
1993) (finding that law school journalist qualifies for protection under federal common law, even if non-
professional status could bar protection under New York state law). 
 29. FRANKLIN ET AL., supra note 25, at 451.  This Note focuses on the constitutional privilege.  
State statutes are discussed in Part III, infra, as an additional layer of protection for high school student 
journalists. 
 30. State common law privilege is beyond the scope of this Note.  Briefly, state common law 
privilege is largely redundant given that all but two federal circuits have recognized either a federal 
common law privilege or a privilege rooted in the First Amendment.  See The Reporter’s Privilege 
Compendium, supra note 9. 
 31. Part-Time Reporter Finds Himself Unlikely Journalism Hero, FIRST AMEND. CTR. (July 4, 
2004), http://perma.cc/9GST-AW9W (“Lucy Dalglish, executive director of the Reporters Committee 
for Freedom of the Press, argues that forcing a journalist to reveal sources to benefit one party in a 
lawsuit would jeopardize the perceived independence of the media.  And it could have a chilling effect 
on other people’s willingness to speak.”).  
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jurisdictions have declined to find a reporter’s privilege in the First Amendment.32  
Even the jurisdictions that recognize a First Amendment reporter’s privilege do not 
privilege all instances of “newsgathering” or all persons who “report news.”33  The 
parameters of the privilege are perilously unclear, leading to sobering consequences 
for journalists who relied on, but ultimately fell outside of, the privilege’s 
coverage.34 
It would not be unfair to blame the Supreme Court for the lack of clarity in the 
First Amendment reporter’s privilege jurisprudence.  The high court has only ruled 
once on the evidentiary privilege, generating the fractured decision in Branzburg v. 
Hayes.35  The 1972 case involved three reporters who fought federal grand jury 
subpoenas for their confidential sources and notes by claiming a First Amendment 
privilege.36  The four justices in the plurality found that the press did not have any 
“First Amendment privilege to refuse to answer the relevant and material questions 
asked during a good faith grand jury investigation.”37  At the other extreme, Justice 
Douglas argued that the press had an absolute privilege against court-ordered 
disclosure.38  Splitting the difference, Justice Stewart and two other dissenting 
justices found a qualified First Amendment reporter’s privilege that can be defeated 
if the subpoenaing party:  (1) demonstrates a reasonable belief that the information 
is “clearly relevant to a specific probable violation of law”; (2) establishes a 
“compelling interest” in the information and (3) shows that the information could 
not be obtained by means “less destructive” to First Amendment rights.39 
Though concurring with the plurality in result, Justice Powell agreed with 
Justice Stewart that the First Amendment provides a qualified reporter’s privilege.  
Justice Powell’s concurrence called for a “case-by-case” analysis whereby courts 
must strike “a proper balance between freedom of the press and the obligation of all 
citizens to give relevant testimony with respect to criminal conduct.”40  Justice 
Powell found that a journalist has “access to the court on a motion to quash” if he 
believes that he is being compelled to disclose “information bearing only a remote 
and tenuous relationship to the subject of the investigation, or . . . his testimony 
implicates confidential source relationships without a legitimate need of law 
 
 32. See, e.g., McKevitt v. Pallasch, 339 F.3d 530, 533 (7th Cir. 2003) (holding that reporter’s 
privilege applied only where allowed by state law).  
 33. See Jason M. Shepard, Bloggers After the Shield:  Defining Journalism in Privilege Law, 1 J. 
MEDIA L. & ETHICS 186, 187 (2006) (“[J]ail sentences for journalists who refuse to turn over 
newsgathering material to federal law enforcement investigators have become longer and more frequent 
in recent years.”). 
 34. See id. at 186 (discussing blogger Josh Wolf’s 226-day detention, freelance writer Vanessa 
Leggett’s 168-day detention and New York Times editor Judith Miller’s 85 days in jail for contempt). 
 35. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972).  
 36. Id. at 667–77. 
 37. Id. at 708. 
 38. Id. at 712–13 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (noting that the public interest balancing had already 
been done by those who wrote the Bill of Rights, who cast “the First Amendment in absolute terms” to 
“repudiate[] the timid, watered-down, emasculated versions of the First Amendment which both the 
Government and the [press] advance in the case”). 
 39. Id. at 743 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (footnotes omitted). 
 40. Id. at 710 (Powell, J., concurring). 
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enforcement.”41 
After Branzburg, the Supreme Court washed its hands of the reporter’s privilege 
and left lower courts to fend for themselves.42  A few courts have adhered to the 
Branzburg plurality.43  Through what critics call “creative[] counting,” however, 
most jurisdictions have fashioned a qualified First Amendment reporter’s privilege 
from Branzburg’s concurrence and dissents.44 While reporters do not enjoy 
absolute protection against court-ordered disclosure in these jurisdictions,45 a 
qualified privilege can still deter courts, prosecutors and litigants from hijacking 
investigative journalism.46 
II.  STUDENT REPORTERS HAVE AS MUCH ENTITLEMENT TO A 
FIRST AMENDMENT PRIVILEGE AS THEIR PROFESSIONAL 
COUNTERPARTS 
Arguing against a reporter’s privilege for the Saratoga High School student 
reporters, Mr. Allard claimed that “student reporters do not qualify as legitimate 
journalists because they are not professionally employed by a news gathering 
organization.”47  A First Amendment reporter’s privilege that covers more than the 
traditional institutional press has been an alarming thought for many judges.  
Branzburg only involved the institutional press,48 but the plurality refused to carve 
out a reporter’s privilege in part because defining the coverage of such a privilege 
“would present practical and conceptual difficulties of a high order.”49  Justice 
 
 41. Id. at 709–10. 
 42. See Tom Isler, Comment, Chevron Corp. v. Berlinger and the Future of the Journalists’ 
Privilege for Documentary Filmmakers, 160 U. PENN. L. REV. 865, 871 (2012) (surveying reporter’s 
privilege jurisprudence post-Branzburg). 
 43. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 810 F.2d 580, 586 (6th Cir. 1987) (following the 
Branzburg plurality and holding that the privilege applied only where allowed by state law); see also 
WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 18 (surveying the aftermath of Branzburg and noting that years after 
Branzburg, the Sixth Circuit in In re Grand Jury Proceedings was the first appellate court to follow the 
Branzburg plurality). 
 44. Stephen I. Vladeck, Democratic Competence, Constitutional Disorder, and the Freedom of 
the Press, 87 WASH. L. REV. 529, 541 (2012); see, e.g., N.Y. Times Co. v. Gonzales, 459 F.3d 160, 174 
(2d Cir. 2006) (applying the test from Justice Powell’s Branzburg concurrence and finding that First 
Amendment privilege applied); Zerilli v. Smith, 656 F.2d 705, 714 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (finding that First 
Amendment reporter’s privilege applied unless the subpoenaed information was crucial to the case and 
could not be obtained from any other source).  
 45. In a decision that was released just two months after Branzburg, the Second Circuit refused to 
extend Branzburg’s plurality to civil cases.  Baker v. F & F Inv., 470 F.2d 778, 782–83 (2d Cir. 1972) 
(reading Branzburg as denying absolute reporter’s privilege but preserving qualified privilege when 
disclosure would threaten “the freedom of the press and the public’s need to be informed”). 
 46. See FRANKLIN ET AL., supra note 29, at 465–66; see also Gonzales v. NBC, 194 F. 3d 29, 33 
(2d Cir. 1999) (mentioning with approval the “Justice Department Guidelines discouraging any attempt 
to subpoena the press to appear before grand juries, and stipulating that all reasonable attempts should 
be made to obtain information from non-press sources before there is any consideration of subpoenaing 
the press”). 
 47. Vargas-Cooper, supra note 5. 
 48. The case involved reporters employed by the New York Times, the Louisville Courier-Journal 
and a Massachusetts television station.  Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 667–79 (1972). 
 49. Id. at 704.  
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White, writing for the plurality, was especially wary of potential exploitation of the 
reporter’s privilege by “sham newsmen.”50  While some proponents of the 
reporter’s privilege have scoffed at the idea of “sham newsmen,” most would agree 
with Justice White that the coverage question is “the most difficult question in 
formulating the privilege.”51 
Few courts have considered whether student reporters fall within the coverage of 
the privilege,52 and none have looked at the coverage of the privilege in the context 
of high school student reporters.  However, shielding high school student reporters 
would be a reasonable application of the First Amendment reporter’s privilege.  
Outside of the reporter’s privilege context, the Supreme Court has emphasized the 
broad range of works that First Amendment-protected “press” encompasses.53  
Consistent with a broad definition of “press,” courts have found the reporter’s 
privilege available to a variety of non-traditional newsgatherers, including freelance 
reporters,54 authors,55 academics,56 investment analysts,57 a credit rating agency,58 a 
nonprofit law group,59 a publisher of indices and price ranges for the natural gas 
 
 50. Id. at 705 n.40 (expressing fear that the reporter’s “privilege might be claimed by groups that 
set up newspapers in order to engage in criminal activity”). 
 51. Some commentators have questioned whether Justice White’s “sham newsmen” exist outside 
of “law school examinations.”  WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 18.  For those commentators, even if 
sham newsmen did exist, they “become a threat only if the [reporter’s] privilege is made absolute.”  Id. 
 52. Persky v. Yeshiva Univ., No. 01 Civ. 5278(LMM), 2002 WL 31769704, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 
10, 2002) (applying reporter’s privilege to an undergraduate journalist); see also Blum v. Schlegel, 150 
F.R.D. 42, 43 (W.D.N.Y. 1993) (applying reporter’s privilege to a law school student). 
 53. Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 452 (1938) (“The press in its historic connotation 
comprehends every sort of publication which affords a vehicle of information and opinion.”).  For an 
example of a case that relies on the Lovell interpretation of “press,” see CFTC v. McGraw-Hill Cos., 390 
F. Supp. 2d 27, 31–32 (D.D.C. 2005). 
 54. See, e.g., United States v. Lindh, 210 F. Supp.2d 780, 783 (E.D. Va. 2002) (holding that a 
freelance writer covering Afghanistan for CNN could assert reporter’s privilege).  
 55. See, e.g., Shoen v. Shoen, 5 F.3d 1289, 1293 (9th Cir. 1993) (extending reporter’s privilege 
protection to the authors of books). 
 56. See Cusumano v. Microsoft Corp., 162 F.3d 708, 714–15 (1st Cir. 1998) (extending reporter’s 
privilege to cover the pre-publication manuscripts of a professor).  But see In re Request from the U.K. 
Pursuant to the Treaty Between the Gov’t of the U.S. & the Gov’t of the U.K. on Mutual Assistance in 
Criminal Matters in the Matter of Dolours Price, 685 F.3d 1, 20–21 (1st Cir. 2012) (Torruella, J., 
concurring in the judgment only) (characterizing the majority opinion as disregarding Cusumano to the 
extent that it protects academics).  Notably, the Ninth Circuit has explicitly denied protection to 
academics.  Scarce v. United States, 5 F.3d 397, 402–03 (9th Cir. 1993). 
 57. Summit Tech., Inc. v. Healthcare Capital Grp., Inc., 141 F.R.D. 381, 384 (D. Mass. 1992) 
(“Whether or not [an investment analyst] is a member of the ‘organized press’ per se, it appears that he 
is engaged in the dissemination of investigative information to the investing business community . . . 
[and] is entitled to raise the claim of privilege with respect to his confidential source as would any other 
media reporter.”). 
 58. In re Scott Paper Co. Sec. Litig., 145 F.R.D. 366, 368–70 (E.D. Pa. 1992) (finding that 
Standard & Poor’s qualified for reporter’s privilege because of intent to disseminate information for the 
public good); see also Geer v. Cox, No. 01-2583-JAR, 2003 WL 549042, at *2 (D. Kan. Feb. 19, 2003) 
(denying journalist’s privilege for financial shareholders over a confidentially-obtained subscriber list 
because the shareholders lacked intent to disseminate).  
 59. Southwell v. S. Poverty Law Ctr., 949 F. Supp. 1303, 1314–15 (W.D. Mich. 1996) (finding 
that reporter’s privilege barred disclosure of confidential sources in a nonprofit law group’s newsletter).  
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market60 and documentary filmmakers.61  In some jurisdictions, however, the 
current definition of a privileged reporter is likely to categorically exclude high 
school student reporters, even though the definition would certainly cover 
professional reporters.62   
The goals that underlie the First Amendment’s protection of a free press do not 
justify differentiating protection for student reporters and protection for reporters 
who are “professionally employed by a news gathering organization.”63  Instead, 
First Amendment canon has emphasized the importance of protecting the wide 
variety of players that constitute the American “press.”64  Student reporters are not 
“professionally employed by a news gathering organization,” but many of them are 
conducting newsgathering that closely resembles the work of professional 
reporters.  The student press serves the same First Amendment goals as the 
traditional institutional press, and student reporters deserve the same privilege as 
their professional counterparts. 
A.  HIGH SCHOOL STUDENT REPORTERS ARE DEFINED OUT OF THE PRIVILEGE 
IN SOME JURISDICTIONS 
Among the jurisdictions that recognize a First Amendment reporter’s privilege, 
the most widely accepted definition of a privileged reporter is an individual who 
can demonstrate “the intent to use material—sought, gathered or received—to 
disseminate information to the public and that such intent existed at the inception of 
the newsgathering process.”65  The Second Circuit first developed the “intent” test 
in 1987.66  The First, Third and Ninth Circuits have since adopted similar tests.67  
 
 60. See, e.g., CFTC v. McGraw-Hill Cos., Inc., 390 F. Supp. 2d 27, 32 (D.D.C. 2005) (granting 
reporter’s privilege to the publisher of a price index, and noting that the difficulty of defining 
“journalist” militates in favor of a broad construction of the term). 
 61. See Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 563 F.2d 433, 436–37 (10th Cir. 1977) (noting that 
defendant, a documentary filmmaker, was not a traditional news source; but unwilling to find “that the 
fact that [filmmaker] is not a salaried newspaper reporter of itself acts to deprive him of the right to seek 
protective relief”); In re McCray, Richardson, Santana, Wisem & Salaam Litig., 928 F. Supp. 2d 748, 
751 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (finding reporter’s privilege for the makers of a documentary on New York City’s 
“Central Park Five” litigation).  But see Chevron Corp. v. Berlinger, 629 F.3d 297, 307–09 (2d Cir. 
2011) (affirming the district court’s reading of an editorial independence requirement into Von Bulow, 
and holding that a documentary filmmaker did not qualify for First Amendment-based reporter’s 
privilege because the filmmaker did not prove that he gathered the information with sufficient 
independence). 
 62. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.5015 (2014) (defining the coverage of the state shield law to 
include only salaried journalists and paid independent contractors). 
 63. Vargas-Cooper, supra note 5. 
 64. See, e.g., VIRGINIA HOUSE OF DELEGATES, REPORT OF 1799 (1799) [hereinafter REPORT OF 
1799], available at http://perma.cc/JL5C-2ZR9 (“It has accordingly been decided by the practice of the 
states, that it is better to leave a few of its noxious branches to their luxuriant growth, than by pruning 
them away, to injure the vigour of those yielding the proper fruits.”). 
 65. Von Bulow ex rel. Auersperg v. Von Bulow, 811 F.2d 136, 144 (2d Cir. 1987); see Guide 
Compare Tool:  Comparing:  IV.  Who is Covered, REPORTERS COMMITTEE FOR FREEDOM OF THE 
PRESS, http://perma.cc/V823-UTXH (last visited Nov. 8, 2014) (summarizing definition of journalist 
across jurisdictions). 
 66. Von Bulow, 811 F.2d at 144 (finding that the privilege would apply to a book author who 
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The D.C. Circuit has not officially adopted the “intent” test, but a number of D.C. 
district courts have applied some version of the test.68 
In “intent” jurisdictions, high school student reporters’ lack of professional 
employment would not bar them from a reporter’s privilege.  High school student 
reporters should fall under the coverage of the reporter’s privilege as long as they 
can demonstrate intent to use the subpoenaed material “to disseminate information 
to the public and that such intent existed at the inception of the newsgathering 
process.”69  The fact that student reporters gather news as part of their educations 
presents a bigger problem for coverage.  High school student reporters are usually 
enrolled in a journalism class that teaches writing and awards grades for the 
students’ work on the school newspaper.  A court might bar a student reporter from 
the privilege if it found that the reporter began newsgathering with educational 
intent rather than intent of public dissemination.  “Intent” jurisdictions have not 
required public dissemination to be the only intent of protected newsgathering, but 
some have required claimants of First Amendment-based privilege to demonstrate a 
primary intent to “engage[] in investigative reporting [and] gathering news.”70  The 
Third Circuit found that a sports commentator was not entitled to a First 
Amendment-based privilege over his public announcements on wrestling since “his 
announcements [we]re as much entertainment as journalism.”71  Reading the Third 
Circuit’s “intent” test narrowly, a court might conclude that a student reporter had 
the primary intent to learn writing skills rather that to disseminate information to 
the public. 
Although a narrow formulation of the “intent” test can be detrimental to the 
privilege claims of student reporters, the federal courts’ definitions of privileged 
persons do not explicitly exclude students.  By contrast, shield laws in some states 
erect a concrete obstacle to a First Amendment privilege for students.72  Under 
Federal Rule of Evidence 501, Congress has instructed that, “in a civil case, state 
law governs privilege regarding a claim or defense for which state law supplies the 
 
began gathering the subpoenaed information with intent of public dissemination). 
 67. See, e.g., Cusumano v. Microsoft Corp., 162 F.3d 708, 714 (1st Cir. 1998) (citing Von Bulow 
and applying the “intent” test); In re Madden, 151 F.3d 125, 130 (3d Cir. 1998); Shoen v. Shoen, 5 F.3d 
1289, 1294 (9th Cir. 1993).  
 68. See, e.g., CFTC v. McGraw-Hill Cos., 390 F. Supp. 2d 27, 32 (D.D.C. 2005) (finding that the 
reporter’s privilege applied to a publisher of daily and biweekly price indices, because even though the 
reporter “may not be involved in what is most commonly considered traditional news gathering, the 
privilege applies to a broad range of news gatherers”); Tripp v. Dep’t of Defense, 284 F. Supp. 2d 50, 
57–58 (D.D.C. 2003) (summarizing district court decisions).  The Seventh Circuit has focused on 
statutory rather than First Amendment privilege.  See, e.g., Desai v. Hersh, 954 F.2d 1408, 1411 n.3 (7th 
Cir. 1992) (finding that the privilege applied to a book author under Illinois’s reporter shield law).  The 
existence and coverage of a First Amendment privilege is less clear in the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth 
and Tenth Circuits. 
 69. Von Bulow, 811 F.2d at 144. 
 70. In re Madden, 151 F.3d at 130.  
 71. Id. at 126. 
 72. David Greene, Senate Revises Media Shield Law for the Better, But It’s Still Imperfect, ELEC. 
FRONTIER FOUND. (Sept. 20, 2013), http://perma.cc/FY9N-LNAY.  Forty-nine states and the District of 
Columbia recognize journalistic privilege, and forty states currently have shield laws.  It’s Time to Raise 
the Shield!, SOC’Y OF PROF. JOURNALISTS, http://perma.cc/V3Y4-5QQE (last visited Nov. 8, 2014). 
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rule of decision.”73  Furthermore, a federal court may rely on state definitions of 
privileged persons if the federal definitions do not clearly delineate coverage.74 
While some states’ shield laws offer broad protection,75 others define privileged 
journalists in ways that are decidedly unfavorable to high school reporters.76  For 
example, Delaware’s shield law is only applicable to journalists who earn their 
“principal livelihood” through reporting, or who have spent four of the preceding 
eight weeks working over twenty hours per week “in the practice of, obtaining or 
preparing information for dissemination.”77  Florida limits coverage to persons who 
“regularly” engage in newsgathering “for gain or livelihood” while working as a 
salaried employee or contractor for an established media entity.78  High school 
student reporters do not work regular hours on school newspapers or receive 
payment for their work.  Consequently, they are categorically disqualified from 
statutory protection in states that define coverage based on hours and salary.79 
High school students who seek a federal privilege will face the greatest 
challenge in a state that has “a fairly comprehensive legislation that enumerates 
college journalists by name,” but explicitly leaves out high school students.80  
Frank LoMonte, Executive Director of the Student Press Law Center, expressed his 
apprehension about a high school student reporter’s privilege in Maryland, under 
whose shield law:  “The judge wouldn’t be barred from reading the First 
Amendment” to cover high school student reporters, but “you wonder whether a 
judge would be willing to extend a constitutional privilege to people who were 
explicitly left out of statutory privilege.”81  While journalists who have been 
 
 73. FED. R. EVID. 501; see also WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 18 (discussing interpretation of 
Rule 501, which invites federal judges to create federal common law privilege, but mandates that they 
recognize state-delineated privilege in civil cases).  For a fairly complete summary of cases that have 
looked at the interstices of constitutional and statutory privilege through Rule 501, see Desai v. Hersh, 
954 F.2d 1408, 1411 (7th Cir. 1992). 
 74. A First Amendment-based privilege is not clearly established in all federal circuits, so, if 
clearer definitions exist in state statutes, a federal court might look to state definitions out of respect for 
the states.  See, e.g., Desai, 954 F.2d at 1411 (expressing reluctance to extend a constitutional privilege 
where definition of privileged persons in state legislation has expressly excluded persons in claimant’s 
situation).  
 75. See, e.g., MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 26-1-901 to 26-1-903 (2013); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 44.510–
44.540 (2014).  Montana’s Media Confidentiality Act extends protection to persons “connected with” a 
newsgathering organization as long as the privileged information was collected within the person’s 
duties as a newsperson.  MONT. CODE ANN. § 26-1-902 (2013).  Oregon offers a similar statutory 
definition, extending reporter’s privilege to persons “connected with” a “medium of communication,” 
broadly defining the latter phrase.  OR. REV. STAT. § 44.520(1) (2014). 
 76. For a comprehensive, state-by-state survey of existing shield laws, see State-by-State Guide to 
the Reporter’s Privilege for Student Media, STUDENT PRESS LAW CTR. (2010), http://perma.cc/7TN5-
VGU5 [hereinafter State-by-State Guide].  For a detailed examination of different legislative approaches 
on defining the reporter’s privilege, see Sonja R. West, Awakening the Press Clause, 58 UCLA L. REV. 
1025 (2011). 
 77. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, §§ 4320–4326 (2014). 
 78. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.5015 (2014) (explicitly excluding “[b]ook authors and others who are 
not professional [salaried or contractor] journalists” from statutory protection). 
 79. See State-by-State Guide, supra note 76. 
 80. Telephone Interview with Frank LoMonte, supra note 4, at 53:19–54:27.  
 81. Maryland’s statute employs a tiered definition of “journalist.”  Tier one is narrow, requiring 
employment with a news media.  MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 9-112(b)(1), (2) (2014).  Tier 
HU, A SHIELD DOES NOT FALL IN HAZELWOOD, 38 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 207 (2015)  
2015] A SHIELD DOES NOT FALL IN HAZELWOOD 217 
defined out of state shield laws have successfully invoked federal privilege,82 
exclusion from a state’s definition of privileged reporters can impact a judge’s 
determination on the availability of a federal privilege.  To a court, Maryland’s 
exclusion of high school students could appear to be proof that the state legislature 
“has expressed its will that a certain class of people not be covered.”83  If so, the 
court has compelling federalism and separation of powers reasons against finding a 
federal privilege.84 
B.  STUDENT REPORTERS DESERVE THE SAME FIRST AMENDMENT PRIVILEGE AS 
TRADITIONAL REPORTERS 
If a student newspaper offers a public vehicle of information and opinion, and 
undertakes the same kind of newsgathering processes as traditional institutional 
press, then there is no valid reason to disqualify the reporters on the student 
newspaper from a First Amendment reporter’s privilege where members of the 
traditional institutional press would be privileged.85  Many courts have recited the 
Supreme Court’s directive in Lovell v. City of Griffin that the First Amendment 
press “comprehends every sort of publication which affords a vehicle of 
information and opinion.”86  Whether under this broad construction of “press” or a 
narrower, merit-based construction, the First Amendment reporter’s privilege 
should be as available to members of the high school student press as it would be to 
members of the professional press.87 
 
two carves out an exception for students enrolled “in an institution of postsecondary education and 
engaged in any news gathering or news disseminating capacity recognized by the institution as a 
scholastic activity or in conjunction with an activity sponsored, funded, managed or supervised by 
school staff or faculty.”  Id. § 9-112(b)(3) (emphasis added).  The explicit recognition of college 
newspaper writers weighs against a liberal construction of tier one’s “employment” requirement, 
presenting a problem for their high school counterparts.  Telephone Interview with Frank LoMonte, 
supra note 4, at 77:07–77:35. 
 82. See Blum v. Schlegel, 150 F.R.D. 42, 43 (W.D.N.Y. 1993) (finding that law school student 
journalist’s non-professional status excluded the student from New York’s shield law, but applying 
federal reporter’s privilege nonetheless).  
 83. Telephone Interview with Frank LoMonte, supra note 4, at 77:07–77:35. 
 84. Id. (“[A] judge would be naturally disinclined to go against the express will of the [state] 
legislature.”). 
 85. See, e.g., Von Bulow ex rel. Auersperg v. Von Bulow, 811 F.2d 136, 144 (2d Cir. 1987) 
(“Although prior experience as a professional journalist may be persuasive evidence of present intent to 
gather for the purpose of dissemination, it is not the sine qua non.  The burden indeed may be sustained 
by one who is a novice in the field.”). 
 86. Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 452 (1938) (emphasis added). 
 87. In a hearing held by the Committee on the Judiciary, Chip Berlet, co-founder of the College 
Press Services testified on the apparent exclusion of college journalists from the then-proposed federal 
journalist shield bill.  Newsmen’s Privilege:  Hearing on H.R. 717 Before Subcommittee No. 3 of the 
Committee on the Judiciary, 93d Cong. 450 (1973) [hereinafter Hearing on H.R. 717], available at 
http://perma.cc/KGD4-TVK2 (statement of Chip Berlet, Washington Bureau Chief, College Press 
Services) (“I think [high school journalists] are real journalists.  They are young, but they are doing the 
same job as the person 20 years older, and often doing it better.”); see also Dean v. Utica Cmty. Sch., 
345 F. Supp. 2d 799, 811 (E.D. Mich. 2004) (regarding a student reporter’s article on pollution, finding 
no “significant disparity in quality between [the student reporter’s] article in the [high school paper] and 
the similar articles in ‘professional’ newspapers”). 
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Today’s high school newspapers can look a lot like professional newspapers.  
For a taste, flip through Saratoga High School’s student newspaper, the Falcon.  A 
staff of over sixty students—including the three reporters threatened with 
subpoenas—write, edit and produce a twenty-page broadsheet newspaper and a 
regularly updated news website.88  The Saratoga Falcon is just one of many 
impressive newspapers produced by high school students around the United States.  
In 2010, when the Columbia Scholastic Press Association (CSPA) selected the 
Falcon for two Golden Crown Awards,89 the CSPA also selected 157 of the 
Falcon’s peer student publications for honors from a pool of 1556 qualifying 
applicants.90  In 2011, when the National Scholastic Press Association (NSPA) 
nominated the Falcon as a Pacemaker Award finalist in the category of best 
broadsheet newspapers of over seventeen pages,91 the NSPA nominated seventy 
high school news sources, including print newspapers, news magazines and news 
broadcasts.92 
The reporters on school newspapers conduct investigative journalism that 
closely models the newsgathering work of traditional journalists, albeit on topics 
that are of particular interest to high school students, teachers and parents.  Among 
the Falcon staff’s recent news stories are research-driven pieces that delve into the 
influence of financial aid on college selection,93 alert classmates to glitches in the 
College Board’s application site94 and uncover the plight of bullying victims.95  
The school’s journalism advisors and the paper’s student editors enforce quality 
and professionalism standards for the rest of the staff, mirroring editorial 
 
 88. See Vargas-Cooper, supra note 5.  
 89. Saratoga High School’s student newspaper has consistently been recognized by the CSPA for 
its reporting.  See David Eng & Tiffany Tung, Falcon to Receive National Award, SARATOGA FALCON, 
Jan. 26, 2010, http://perma.cc/MQP5-L8TA; Kavya Nagarajan & Andy Tsao, Saratoga Falcon 
Nominated for Crown Award, SARATOGA FALCON, Jan. 26, 2009, available at http://perma.cc/UN9V-
SPTR. 
 90. Gold Circle Awards, COLUM. UNIV., http://perma.cc/Q7W8-AJ6A (last visited Nov. 2, 2014).  
Besides the Crown Awards, CSPA has awarded the Gold Circle to high school students for thirty-one 
years and accepts submissions across 201 categories of journalism.  Last year, the CSPA received 
15,000 submissions for the award and extended 1200 Gold Circles.  Id. 
 91. See Evaline Ju, Newspaper Nominated for National Award, SARATOGA FALCON, Sept. 24, 
2011, http://perma.cc/Y8NN-9EUV. 
 92. 2011 NSPA Newspaper Pacemaker Winners, NAT’L SCHOLASTIC PRESS ASS’N, 
http://perma.cc/2MET-2UEY (last visited Nov. 25, 2014); NSPA Awards Week Day 3:  Newspaper and 
Broadcast Pacemaker, NAT’L SCHOLASTIC PRESS ASS’N NEWS & NOTES BLOG (Sept. 8, 2011), 
http://perma.cc/QZN9-R6TJ.  The NSPA gives out awards twice annually at conferences.  NSPA 
Announces 2013 Pacemaker Winners, NAT’L SCHOLASTIC PRESS ASS’N NEWS & NOTES BLOG (Nov. 
20, 2013), http://perma.cc/6T6N-WAKN.  The Fall 2013 convention saw 5500 student journalists in 
attendance and 2938 applicants for “individual awards.”  Id.  Of those applicants, 233 received 
individual awards for their strong newsgathering, reporting, editorial, design decisions and other areas of 
accomplishment.  Id. 
 93. Nupur Maheshwari & Vibha Seshadri, Scholarship Options Can Lead to Difficult Choices, 
SARATOGA FALCON, Nov. 22, 2013, http://perma.cc/9DMY-9ZHF.  For a glimpse into the time and 
effort that students and schools pour into their newspapers, see Ju, supra note 92.  
 94. Nick Chow & Jonathan Young, Glitches in Common App Site Compound Students’ Stress, 
SARATOGA FALCON, Nov. 22, 2013, http://perma.cc/8PXG-SYMF. 
 95. Samuel Liu, Culture of Judgement, SARATOGA FALCON, Dec. 13, 2013, 
http://perma.cc/HAL8-WB6G. 
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hierarchies in the institutional press.96  Whereas salary, reputation and job-
advancement considerations incentivize professional journalists to uphold 
journalistic standards, student reporters are incentivized to do well in their 
journalism classes by reputation, grades and recommendation letters for college and 
internship applications.  Student reporters will have to meet even higher 
requirements for coverage and writing if the school newspaper participates in 
competitions that are sponsored and judged by professional news organizations, 
since these competitions require “in-depth reporting”—the paramount aspiration of 
traditional journalism.97 
Considering the similarities between high school and professional journalism, 
and given the range of other non-traditional journalists who have qualified for the 
First Amendment reporter’s privilege, is it fair to categorically exclude student 
reporters from a privilege that would apply to their professional counterparts?  The 
canons of the First Amendment do not support such a distinction.98  James 
Madison, the drafter of the First Amendment, argued for  strong First Amendment 
protection of all varieties of press publications.99  A broad protection of press 
outlets encourages the proliferation of information channels, which keeps citizens 
well informed and gives the government access to their opinions.100  Under 
Madison’s theory of the First Amendment, protecting the student press is just as 
important as protecting the professional press, if not more so.  As an information 
channel, the student press serves a community that is largely underserved by 
professional newspapers.101  Student reporters keep teachers, students and students’ 
families informed about current events and social issues that are important to their 
community.102  Although the readership of a typical high school newspaper might 
not be as wide-reaching as that of some professional newspapers, student 
newspapers provide an important platform to amplify the voices of students, 
teachers and parents, some of whom would not otherwise gain access to press 
outlets.103 
 
 96. Tyler J. Buller, Subtle Censorship:  The Problem of Retaliation Against High School 
Journalism Advisers and Three Ways to Stop It, 40 J.L. & EDUC. 609 (2011) (discussing the censorship 
of student press when schools retaliate against high school journalism advisers, emphasizing the 
important role that these advisers play in ensuring the quality and independence of the student press). 
 97. See NSPA Announces 2013 Pacemaker Winners, NAT’L SCHOLASTIC PRESS ASS’N NEWS & 
NOTES BLOG (Nov. 20, 2013), http://perma.cc/6T6N-WAKN.  The NSPA has awarded “Pacemakers” 
every year since 1927 to “recognize, connect and educate the next generation of journalists.”  Id. 
 98. WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 18 (“Attempts to limit the privilege to reporters for 
‘establishment’ newspapers have been attacked as unconstitutional . . . .”); see also Hearing on H.R. 
717, supra note 87 (“I think if a person is acting as a news person, then they are indeed a news person 
and should be considered as such, regardless of age, sex, or race.  I think to define [news person] may be 
a breach of the first amendment.”). 
 99. See REPORT OF 1799, supra note 64.  In his Abrams dissent, Justice Holmes famously rejected 
the prosecution of four socialists and anarchists for distribution of leaflets on First Amendment grounds.  
Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (noting that a “free trade” in 
ideas would act as “the best test of truth” for that idea).  
 100. See generally REPORT OF 1799, supra note 64. 
 101. See generally STUDENT PRESS LAW CTR., supra note 17. 
 102. See Telephone Interview with Frank LoMonte, supra note 4, at 33:38–33:58. 
 103. See id. at 33:58–35:18 (describing professional news sites and Internet news communities 
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In the last few years, the main pushback against broad coverage under the 
reporter’s privilege has centered around whether blogs qualify as legitimate press 
outlets.104  Mr. LoMonte lamented that student reporters have become “collateral 
damage” of judicial and legislative efforts to eject amateur bloggers and national 
security leakers from the reporter’s privilege.105  High school student reporters 
rarely report on crimes, let alone national security secrets.106  The fear that 
privileging non-traditional newsgatherers would allow irresponsible news providers 
to publish high-stakes state secrets, then, seems particularly irrelevant in the high 
school journalism context.107  As a news outlet, high school newspapers resemble 
the core First Amendment press much more than blogs.  High school newspapers 
take significant effort and time to cultivate.  At 133 years old, the Williston 
Northampton School’s Willistonian is the oldest high school newspaper in the 
country.108  Fifty years ago, the Saratoga Falcon was already in print, run by a staff 
that included future director Steven Spielberg.109  Where official high school 
newspapers are involved, judges would have no need to suspect a sham news 
 
such as Patch.com, which frequently re-run articles that originated in high school newspapers).  
 104. See, e.g., Obsidian Fin. Grp., LLC v. Cox, No. 3:11-cv-57-HZ, 2012 WL 1065484, at *13 (D. 
Or. Mar. 27, 2012) (refusing to “expand the Oregon Legislature’s admittedly broad definition of 
‘[m]edium of communication’ to cover all communications made on the Internet”).  But see  Mortg. 
Specialists, Inc. v. Implode-Explode Heavy Indus., Inc., 999 A.2d 184, 189 (N.H. 2010) (defining 
journalist to encompass bloggers and website curators, stating that “freedom of the press is a 
fundamental personal right which is not confined to newspapers and periodicals”).  
 105. Telephone Interview with Frank LoMonte, supra note 4, at 3:10–3:20; see also Randall D. 
Eliason, Leakers, Bloggers, and Fourth Estate Inmates:  The Misguided Pursuit of a Reporter’s 
Privilege, 24 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 385, 386 (2006) (“[R]apid technological changes in both the 
nature and quantity of information regularly made available to the public suggest that a reporter’s 
privilege may soon have to be considered a relic of a simpler era—a relic that now is neither workable 
or necessary.”).  In the Judith Miller case, see supra note 16, Judge Sentelle’s much-cited concurrence 
nearly paraphrased Justice White’s hypothetical “sham newsman” in Branzburg.  Judge Sentelle feared 
that a privilege covering “the stereotypical ‘blogger’ sitting in his pajamas at his personal computer 
posting on the World Wide Web” would also protect “unlawful leaking” by the government official who 
gets an ally to “set up a web log” and interview him under a promise of confidentiality.  See, e.g., In re 
Grand Jury Subpoena to Judith Miller, 397 F.3d 964, 979 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (Sentelle, J., concurring).  
See also Obsidian, 2012 WL 1065484, at *13 (in order to exclude some “communications made on the 
Internet” from a privilege, holding that a qualifying reporter must possess a level of professionalism 
evinced by a journalism degree, association with a traditional news print or association with a television 
media outlet).  But see Blumenthal v. Drudge, 186 F.R.D. 236, 244 (D.D.C. 1999) (finding that Matt 
Drudge, the creator and editor of a well-known news aggregation website, was eligible for a reporter’s 
privilege).   
 106. See Telephone Interview with Frank LoMonte, supra note 4, at 26:40–30:33 (describing his 
interactions with the student press).  
 107. See David E. Pozen, The Leaky Leviathan:  Why the Government Condemns and Condones 
Unlawful Disclosures of Information, 127 HARV. L. REV. 512, 516–17 (2013) (while the government 
has implemented harsher leak laws due to increasing concerns about WikiLeaks and similar 
“revelation[s] of sensitive information to the public and to foreign adversaries,” “[c]ivil libertarians have 
assailed the last two Administrations’ ‘war’ on leaking and sought federal shield legislation for 
journalists and enhanced doctrinal protections for their sources”).  
 108. History of the Willistonian, WILLISTONIAN, http://perma.cc/QQ44-Q367 (last visited Nov. 25, 
2014). 
 109. Amy Lin & Sabrina Chen, The Halls that Spielberg Walked, 50 Years Later, Feb. 12, 2014, 
http://perma.cc/4SGF-LDC8. 
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outlet.110 
Other influential theories of the First Amendment focus on the importance of 
producing courageous and engaged citizens who are committed to the project of 
self-government.111  Examining these theories and applying them in a case that 
dramatically expanded press protections, the Supreme Court held that a legal 
regime that “dampens the vigor and limits the variety of public debate . . . is 
inconsistent with the First and Fourteenth Amendments.”112  If student reporters are 
categorically excluded from a reporter’s privilege, they could be deterred from 
reporting on the kinds of stories that would expose them to court-ordered 
disclosures.  In other words, categorical exclusion of student reporters increases the 
likelihood of reporter self-censorship that “is inconsistent with the First and 
Fourteenth Amendments.”113 
Categorical exclusion of student reporters also leads to self-censorship on the 
part of would-be informants.  Reporters often hide the names of their whistleblower 
sources.114  If whistleblowers do not have faith that a reporter can control the 
information she gathers, they are more likely to refrain from exposing 
governmental misconduct to the press and public.115  Even when sources do come 
forward, they might limit the scope of the information that they share with 
reporters.  In the student press context, reporters have yet another reason to protect 
their relationships with sources:  “school media are often most students’ first 
exposure to the press.”116  If students’ “earliest perception of the media is that 
reporters cannot be trusted it is unlikely their views will change later.”117 
Privileging student reporters helps them inspire confidence in the independence 
of the press, and makes their peers more likely to provide information to the press 
in the future.  Privileging student reporters promotes “a free, vigorous student 
press” that not only offers “a healthy ferment of ideas and opinions,”118 but also 
serves as a check on the government.119  Granted, student newspapers do not often 
 
 110. See In re Miller, 397 F.3d at 979–80 (Sentelle, J., concurring) (describing a sham news outlet 
that can be created in three minutes for the purposes of allowing a government agent to leak national 
security information). 
 111. See Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring) (“To 
courageous, self-reliant men, with confidence in the power of free and fearless reasoning applied 
through the processes of popular government, no danger flowing from speech can be deemed clear and 
present, unless the incidence of the evil apprehended is so imminent that it may befall before there is 
opportunity for full discussion.”); see also N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 296–97 & n.6 
(1964) (Black, J., concurring) (citing Alexander Meiklejohn, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-
GOVERNMENT (1948)). 
 112. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 279 (majority opinion).  
 113. Id. 
 114. See Telephone Interview with Frank LoMonte, supra note 4, at 26:40–30:33. 
 115. Lauren Kirchner, Warnings from Whistleblowers Past, COLUM. JOURNALISM REV. (Nov. 6, 
2013, 2:50 PM), http://perma.cc/887J-W2RX. 
 116. State-by-State Guide, supra note 76.  
 117. Id.  
 118. JACK NELSON, CAPTIVE VOICES:  THE REPORT OF THE COMMISSION OF INQUIRY INTO HIGH 
SCHOOL JOURNALISM (1974) (“Censorship is the fundamental cause of the triviality, innocuousness and 
uniformity that characterize the high school press.”). 
 119. Vincent Blasi, The Checking Value in First Amendment Theory, 1977 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 
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uncover federal or state governmental abuses, but they do frequently expose the 
wrongdoing of smaller scale governmental actors, such as schools and school 
boards.  In Dean v. Utica Community Schools, for instance, high school junior Katy 
Dean investigated her school district’s alleged wrongdoing after finding out that the 
school district was being sued for school bus pollutions that caused lung cancer.120  
The checking function of the First Amendment does not justify scaling protection 
for speech on the basis of the level of government that it checks, since small 
government is as prone to abuse as big government.121 
Shielding high school reporters against subpoenas does not unduly impede the 
interests of justice.122  Denying student reporters a reporter’s privilege, on the other 
hand, creates negative repercussions for the future of the press.  In their objections 
to proposed federal shield laws that would exclude student reporters from coverage, 
professional reporters have expressed their firm belief that the freedom of the high 
school press plays a critical role in shaping the future of the press.123  Serving on 
school newspapers, students begin to develop the professional courage and 
internalize the professional ethics of journalism.124  High school students 
participate in activities like the school newspaper to develop career interests and 
broaden career opportunities.125  Many of today’s high school journalists will 
become tomorrow’s professional journalists.  Giving high school students less 
protection for their newsgathering not only chills the vigor of the journalism they 
produce today, 126 but also breeds a habit of self-censorship that the student 
reporters will carry with them if and when they become professional journalists.127 
  
 
521, 528 (1977).  
 120. Dean v. Utica Cmty. Sch., 345 F. Supp. 2d 799 (E.D. Mich. 2004).  
 121. James Madison, Speech to the U.S. House of Representatives, June 8, 1789, excerpted in 
Vincent Blasi, IDEAS OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 200 (2d ed. 2012) (positing that state governments 
might be more likely to abuse their powers than federal government). 
 122. Cf. WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 18 (describing the judicial and legislative pushback 
against a broad reporter’s privilege that would include Internet bloggers).  
 123. See, e.g., Hearing on H.R. 717, supra note 87, at 452; WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 18. 
 124. “Where a free, vigorous student press does exist, there is a healthy ferment of ideas and 
opinions with no indication of disruption or negative side effects on the educational experience of the 
school.” NELSON, supra note 118; see also David Abramowicz, Note, Calculating the Public Interest in 
Protecting Journalists’ Confidential Sources, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1949 (2008) (arguing that, in 
privilege cases, the determination of public interest should factor in journalistic values and journalistic 
ethics). 
 125. See Bd. of Educ. of Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 92 of Pottawatomie Cnty. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 
845 (2002) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“Participation in [extracurricular] activities is a key component of 
school life, essential in reality for students applying to college, and, for all participants, a significant 
contributor to the breadth and quality of the educational experience.”). 
 126. Cf. NELSON, supra note118 (mentioning school censorship as a “fundamental cause of the 
triviality, innocuousness and uniformity that characterize the high school press”). 
 127. College journalism professors believe that high school students “coming into our college 
programs . . . are completely unprepared for what journalism is about.  They think it’s OK to be told 
what to print and what not to print.  They don’t challenge authority like they should.  We have to 
reprogram them.”  STUDENT PRESS LAW CTR., supra note 17, at 2 (quoting Prof. David Cuillier, Chair, 
Univ. of Ariz. Sch. of Journalism, Hazelwood Symposium, Univ. of N.C.–Chapel Hill, Nov. 2012). 
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III.  HAZELWOOD’S “EDUCATIONAL PURPOSE” ARGUMENT DOES 
NOT ALLOW A NON-SCHOOL-AFFILIATED PARTY TO NARROW 
STUDENT FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS 
Skeptics of a First Amendment reporter’s privilege for high school student 
reporters may look to high school First Amendment speech cases to argue that the 
student press triggers inherently weaker First Amendment protections.  Disputing 
the Saratoga Falcon reporters’ eligibility for any reporter’s privilege, Mr. Allard 
emphasized that the school paper does not constitute a vehicle for “information 
communication to the public,” but is instead intended to “educate children.”128  His 
“educational purpose” argument echoed the majority opinion in Hazelwood School 
District v. Kuhlmeier, the Supreme Court’s seminal high school newspaper case.  
The Court distinguished student press from traditional press based on the student 
press’s educational purpose.129  Even though the First Amendment normally 
protects journalists from pre-publication censorship by governmental actors, the 
Hazelwood Court allowed a public high school’s principal to delete two pages of 
student-generated content from the school paper.130 
The “educational purpose” argument in Hazelwood gives school officials an 
established basis to limit student reporters’ exercise of their First Amendment 
rights.  But it is far from clear that courts would allow non-school-affiliated parties 
to justify incursions on student rights under the “educational purpose” argument.  
No court has directly addressed a high school student’s First Amendment rights 
against non-school-affiliated parties that attempt to access student works.  Since 
Hazelwood and its progeny have only involved the school officials and students,131 
it is not clear whether Hazelwood stands for:  (1) the limited First Amendment 
rights in works prepared for educational purposes132 or (2) judicial deference to 
school officials’ authority to implement educational purposes.133  The way that a 
court interprets Hazelwood has significant bearing on whether subpoenaed student 
reporters would be protected by the First Amendment to the same extent as their 
non-student counterparts.  If Hazelwood stands for the limited First Amendment 
rights in works prepared for “educational purposes,” then a court might not 
 
 128. See Vargas-Cooper, supra note 5.  
 129. See Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 270 (1988) (finding that the First 
Amendment did not protect a student reporter from pre-publication censorship because the school 
intended its paper as a “supervised learning experience for journalism students” and not as a forum for 
public expression).  But see NELSON, supra note 118 (rebutting Hazelwood’s characterization of the 
student press). 
 130. See Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 263. 
 131. See Dan V. Kozlowski, Unchecked Deference:  Hazelwood’s Too Broad and Too Loose 
Application in the Circuit Courts, 3 U. BALT. J. MEDIA L. & ETHICS 1, 5 (2012) (summarizing circuit 
courts’ applications of Hazelwood in the last two decades).  
 132. Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 267 (holding that no public forum exists if the school has reserved its 
newspaper for non-public educational purposes).  
 133. See Kozlowski, supra note 131.  The Supreme Court in Hazelwood conflated these two 
threads when it required subsequent courts to defer to the school’s determination of whether its 
newspaper is a forum for limited educational use or for public discourse, even if the school did not 
communicate its determination in advance.  Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 267. 
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differentiate between school officials’ and unaffiliated parties’ authority to pierce 
students’ First Amendment rights.  On the other hand, if Hazelwood stands for the 
school’s unique authority to implement educational purposes, then, against non-
school-affiliated subpoenaing parties, student reporters have the same claim to 
whatever First Amendment privilege their non-student counterparts would receive. 
The existing high school student speech cases weigh in favor of the 
interpretation that school officials enjoy special judicial deference in matters of 
education.  Copyright cases offer more explicit corroboration that where a court 
might accept a school’s educational purpose for restricting student rights, the 
“educational purpose” argument is largely unavailable for non-school-affiliated 
parties.134  Considering the student speech and copyright cases, student reporters’ 
First Amendment protections against non-school-affiliated subpoenaing parties 
should be equivalent to the First Amendment protections available to non-student 
reporters. 
A.  HIGH SCHOOL SPEECH CASES STAND FOR JUDICIAL DEFERENCE TO 
SCHOOLS’ DETERMINATION OF EDUCATIONAL PURPOSE 
Over the last century, federal courts have systematically narrowed the First 
Amendment rights of high school students.  Tinker v. Des Moines Independent 
Community School District excluded “substantially disrupt[ive]” student speech 
from the First Amendment’s protection.135  Morse v. Frederick further excluded 
drug-related speech at “school-sponsored” functions.136  Hazelwood, a particularly 
problematic decision, has allowed pre-publication censorship of student speech in 
school-sponsored forums.137  Over the last two decades, courts have applied 
Hazelwood in many First Amendment cases outside of the pre-publication 
censorship context.138  Lower courts have upheld school disciplinary actions 
punishing the off-campus speech of student bloggers.139  Even so, Hazelwood and 
other high school student speech cases do not justify reducing or even eliminating 
the First Amendment reporter’s privilege for student reporters.  To argue that 
student reporters cannot claim a First Amendment reporter’s privilege against 
 
 134. See A.V. ex rel. Vanderhye v. iParadigms, LLC, 562 F.3d 630 (4th Cir. 2009) 
(acknowledging copyright in students’ homework, but permitting school-designated affiliates to pierce 
student copyrights for educational purposes).  
 135. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 512–13 (1969). 
 136. Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393 (2007) (holding that student poster with slogan “Bong Hits 
4 Jesus” was not protected First Amendment speech). 
 137. Emily Gold Waldman, Returning to Hazelwood’s Core:  A New Approach to Restrictions on 
School-Sponsored Speech, 60 FLA. L. REV. 63 (2008). 
 138. Id. (highlighting two circuit-splits in cases that test:  (1) the scope of Hazelwood and (2) 
whether Hazelwood means that the First Amendment allows schools’ viewpoint discrimination of 
student speech, arguing that Hazelwood should not be the framework for in the second category of 
cases).   
 139. Doninger v. Niehoff, 642 F.3d 334, 344–45 (2d Cir. 2011) (declining to reach whether the 
First Amendment allows school officials to restrict a student’s off-campus Internet speech, but granting 
the school officials qualified immunity because the law on First Amendment protections for student 
speech is not clearly established). 
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court-ordered disclosure because of the school newspaper’s “educational purpose” 
is to ignore the special status of the school at the center of the high school First 
Amendment speech decisions. 
The “educational purpose” of the student newspaper operated on two fronts in 
Hazelwood.  First, it persuaded the Supreme Court to characterize the school paper 
as a special type of non-public forum, subject to school control over content.140  
Subsequent courts have disagreed over whether all school newspapers designed for 
student education should be characterized as non-public forums.  In 2004, a 
Michigan federal court held that the high school’s paper was a limited public forum 
rather than a non-public forum, and therefore the school principal could not ban a 
student from being published in the newspaper based on the content of her news 
story.141  Whether a school newspaper is a public forum,142 a limited public forum 
or a non-public forum affects the scope of students’ First Amendment protection 
against pre-publication interference from the school, but does not diminish 
students’ claim to post-publication protection from non-school-affiliated 
subpoenaing parties.  In the words of the Hazelwood Court itself, the educational 
purpose of the student paper speaks to the “educators’ authority over school 
sponsored publications.”143 
Second—and more importantly—the Hazelwood Court to deferred to the 
school’s “legitimate pedagogical concerns” for regulating student speech.144  
Quoting its earlier decision in Bethel School District v. Fraser, a case involving 
lewd student speech at a school assembly, the Hazelwood Court reiterated that it 
“recognized that ‘[t]he determination of what manner of speech in the classroom or 
in school assembly is inappropriate properly rests with the school board,’ rather 
than with the federal courts.”145  The Hazelwood Court held that the First 
Amendment “require[s] judicial intervention to protect students’ constitutional 
rights” only when a school can offer “no valid educational purpose” for censoring 
 
 140. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 268 (1988) (declining to provide First 
Amendment protection from pre-publication censorship because school intended its paper as a 
“supervised learning experience for journalism students” and not as a forum for public expression); id. at 
270 (deferring to the school board’s policy, which provided that school-sponsored “publications are 
developed within the adopted curriculum and its educational implications in regular classroom 
activities” (emphasis added)).  The non-public forum doctrine allowed the Hazelwood Court to find for 
the school without overturning its earlier decision in Tinker, 393 U.S. 503, 504, 513 (1969), where the 
Court found that a public high school violated students’ First Amendment rights by suspending the 
students for wearing black armbands in protest of the Vietnam War. 
 141. Dean v. Utica Cmty. Sch., 345 F. Supp. 2d 799 (E.D. Mich. 2004) (distinguishing Hazelwood 
on the amount of control the school exercised over its paper; finding that school’s censorship of a 
student reporter’s article on bus pollution was a violation of the student’s First Amendment rights). 
 142. Judges may deem a school publication a public forum only if “school authorities have by 
‘policy or by practice’” opened their publications for “indiscriminate use by the general public, or by 
some segment of the public, such as student organizations.”  Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 267 (emphasis 
added) (quoting Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U. S. 37, 46 n.7, 47 (1983)).  
 143. Id. at 271 (emphasis added). 
 144. Id. at 273. 
 145. Id. at 267 (quoting Bethel Sch. Dist. v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 683 (1984)).  The directive that 
federal courts defer to public schools, which are largely state-run, could be explained in part by 
federalism concerns. 
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student press.146 
Hazelwood does not explicitly give schools the authority to restrict the post-
publication rights of student reporters, including students’ right to an evidentiary 
privilege in court.147  On the contrary, the Hazelwood Court stated that while “[a] 
school need not tolerate student speech that is inconsistent with its ‘basic 
educational mission,’ . . . the government could not censor similar speech outside 
the school.”148  Some scholars have urged courts to turn away from Hazelwood 
when adjudicating cases such as content-based regulation of textbooks,149 school 
regulation of students’ off-campus speech150 and regulation of non-students’ in-
school speech.151  Assuming arguendo that Hazelwood does allow school officials 
to restrict student reporters’ post-publication rights, Hazelwood would still be 
inapplicable to the actions of non-school-affiliated parties.152  The Court’s 
conclusion that “school officials may impose reasonable restrictions on the speech 
of students, teachers, and other members of the school community” supports the 
interpretation that a court-ordered disclosure violates students’ First Amendment 
rights even if a school-ordered disclosure would not.153 
Hazelwood and other high school speech cases have emphasized the special role 
of the “educator” and deferred to school officials’ expertise in educational best 
practices.154  Judges would neither give the same deference to parties unaffiliated 
with the school, nor permit such parties to encroach on students’ First Amendment 
protections where a school could have justified similar encroachments based on 
“legitimate pedagogical concerns.”  Accordingly, the “educational purpose” 
argument is not available to non-school-affiliated parties that attempt to interfere 
with students’ rights. 
 
 146. Id. at 273 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
 147. Scholars, courts and members of the press have objected to the wide application of 
Hazelwood’s “legitimate pedagogical concerns” standard in subsequent school speech cases.  See, e.g., 
Kozlowski, supra note 131, at 1 (“Analysis shows that circuit courts have broadened Hazelwood’s scope 
and expansively interpreted the ‘legitimate pedagogical concerns’ standard, showing generally 
unchecked deference to schools.”); see also Allison E. Hayes, From Armbands to Douchebags:  How 
Doninger v. Niehoff Shows the Supreme Court Needs to Address Student Speech in the Cyber Age, 43 
AKRON L. REV 247 (2010). 
 148. Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 266 (quoting Fraser, 478 U.S. at 685 ). 
 149. See generally Waldman, supra note 138. 
 150. See Hayes, supra note 149. 
 151. See id.; see also Fleming v. Jefferson Cnty., 298 F.3d 918 (10th Cir. 2002) 
(applying Hazelwood to bar parents of several Columbine High School shooting victims from painting 
religious symbols on shooting memorial). 
 152. Whether school officials can compel disclosure is an interesting question that is beyond the 
scope of this Note.  The Student Press Law Center has postulated that the school officials lack the 
authority to enforce compliance.  See Legal Protections for Journalists’ Sources and Information, 
STUDENT PRESS LAW CTR., http://perma.cc/3SGH-QJJ3 (last updated Nov. 21, 2014).  Alternatively, the 
officials might encounter First Amendment and state statutory barriers.  Id. 
 153. Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at  267 (emphasis added).  
 154. See, e.g., Travis Miller, Note, Doninger v. Niehoff: Taking Tinker Too Far, 5 LIBERTY UNIV. 
L. REV. 303 (2011) (characterizing Hazelwood as allowing schools to demand higher standards of 
conduct for students that participate in extracurricular activities, and giving schools more deference as 
they uphold those standards). 
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B.  ANALOGIZING TO COPYRIGHT PROTECTIONS FOR STUDENT WORKS 
Contraction of student rights in high school First Amendment cases does not 
reflect any fundamental defect in students’ rights in their writings, but instead 
reveals judicial deference to schools in matters of education.  Copyright cases 
buttress this interpretation and paint a clearer picture of the relationships between 
schools, students and third parties.  It is well established that student works are 
entitled to copyright protection,155 whereas students’ eligibility for reporter’s 
privilege is in debate.  Unless the alleged infringer can assert an affirmative defense 
such as fair use, copyright law would protect student and professional authors 
alike.156  Recent copyright cases show that, for student and non-student works, 
schools and school-affiliates have an improved chance of qualifying for a fair use 
defense based on educational reasons.  When asserted by non-school affiliated 
parties, however, the “educational purposes” argument is generally ineffective. 
1.  High School Student Works and Fair Use 
The First Amendment consequences of an absolute monopoly on ideas and 
expression require copyrights to be qualified by fair use.157  As is the case with 
many circuits’ reporter’s privilege analyses,158 fair use analysis requires courts to 
weigh rights holder’s and society’s interests in deciding whether to permit a 
piercing of a rights holder’s protection.159  On a “case-by-case” basis, courts must 
determine fair use along four statutory factors.160  Congress did not intend these 
factors to be exclusive, but in practice, courts have rarely considered factors outside 
of the list.161  Moreover, courts tend to give two of the statutory factors greater 
weight:  Factor one—the purpose and character of the unauthorized use, including 
 
 155. The copyright statute’s protection “does include any work a student creates within the scope 
of any particular class s/he takes . . . . Using a student’s work without permission involves copyright 
infringement.”  FRITZ DOLAK, BALL STATE UNIV. COPYRIGHT & INTELLECTUAL PROP. OFFICE, 
STUDENTS’ RIGHTS IN COPYRIGHT (Nov. 2003), available at http://perma.cc/QC8L-239J. 
 156. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 577 (1993) (“The fair use doctrine thus 
‘permits [and requires] courts to avoid rigid application of the copyright statute when, on occasion, it 
would stifle the very creativity which that law is designed to foster.’” (quoting Stewart v. Abend, 495 
U.S. 207, 236 (1990))).  
 157. In Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873, 876 (2012), the Supreme Court held that “the 
‘idea/expression dichotomy’ and the ‘fair use’ defense . . . serve as ‘built-in First Amendment 
accommodations’” against a complete copyright monopoly. 
 158. See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 743 (1972) (Stewart, J., dissenting). 
 159. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012); see, e.g., Jennifer M. Urban, How Fair Use Can Help Solve the 
Orphan Book Problem, 27 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1379, 1414 (2012) (“The first and often most 
important question considered in fair use cases is whether the purpose of the defendant’s use furthers 
core societal goals—such as learning, access to information, freedom of speech and expression, and 
innovation—or whether such use simply interferes with the rights of the copyright holder to exploit her 
rights in the work.”).  
 160. 17 U.S.C. § 107; Campbell, 510 U.S. at 577.  
 161. Barton Beebe, An Empirical Study of U.S. Copyright Fair Use Opinions, 1978–2005, 156 U. 
PA. L. REV. 549, 564 (2008) (compiling all federal court fair use opinions from 1978–2005 and finding 
that 17% of courts considered factors outside the enumerated list, and 8.8% stated that a non-enumerated 
factor was relevant). 
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whether the use is “for nonprofit educational purposes”—and factor four—the 
impact of the unauthorized use on the right holder’s economic interests in her 
copyright.162  The way that courts have balanced factors one and four sheds light on 
who can successfully assert “educational purposes” to justify an intrusion on 
students’ legal rights.163 
The Fourth Circuit’s decision in A.V. ex rel. Vanderhye v. iParadigms shows 
that courts allow unauthorized use of protected student works when schools 
authorized the alleged infringer to use such works for the school’s educational 
purposes.  In 2007, four high school students sued iParadigms—the parent 
company of Turnitin, a plagiarism detection service164—for copyright 
infringement.165  Currently, 6500 middle and high schools worldwide are paying to 
license the service.166  Turnitin asks students for consent before checking their 
work for plagiarism,167 but a participating school can unilaterally decide to archive 
its students’ submissions on Turnitin.168  Turnitin archived many of the “over 110 
million papers” in its student paper archive without obtaining express permission 
from student authors.169  Some students and teachers have pushed back against 
 
 162. See, e.g., Urban, supra note 159.  The second and third factors describe the copyrighted work 
and the unauthorized use, respectively.  Based on a statistical analysis on all reported federal fair use 
decisions between 2005 and 1978 (when fair use was codified), factors one and four are almost equally 
dispositive, but substantially more outcome-determinative than the other factors.  Beebe, supra note 161 
(finding that in 83.8% of decisions the outcome of factor four coincided with the decision, and in 81.5% 
of the time for factor one, but that factor two only agreed with the end result in 50.2% of opinions).  
 163. See H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 66–72 (1976) (providing guidance on valid educational 
purpose under § 107).  While it is true that transformative or educational purpose is to be considered by 
statutory mandate, there is no statutory mandate that courts give substantial weight to this factor as is 
done in practice.  The importance of an educational interest in the eyes of the court can therefore be 
gleaned from this analysis. 
 164. A.V. ex rel. Vanderhye v. iParadigms, LLC, 562 F.3d 630, 634 (4th Cir. 2009) (“When a 
school subscribes to iParadigms’ service, it typically requires its students to submit their written 
assignments via a ‘web-based system available at www.turnitin.com or via an integration between 
Turnitin and a school’s course management system.’”). 
 165. A.V. v. iParadigms, LLC, 544 F. Supp. 2d 473 (E.D. Va. 2008). 
 166. Middle & High School, TURNITIN, http://perma.cc/7D3D-Q8ZY (last visited Nov. 21, 2014). 
 167. iParadigms, 562 F.3d at 635 (summarizing the process of student enrollment in Turnitin, 
whereby students must first consent to participation by agreeing to the terms of Turnitin’s blanket 
“Clickwrap Agreement”).  It is debatable whether the students’ consent to enrollment is actually 
meaningful, since “failure to do so would result in a grade of ‘zero’ for [a student] assignment” under 
schools’ policies.  Id.; see also Second Amended Complaint for Copyright Infringement at 7, A.V. v. 
iParadigms, LLC, 544 F. Supp. 2d 473 (E.D. Va. 2008), 2007 WL 2406537 (arguing that student 
plaintiffs’ consent to the “Clickwrap Agreement” was made under duress); Julie D. Cromer Young, 
From the Mouths of Babes:  Protecting Child Authors from Themselves, 112 W. VA. L. REV. 431, 437–
39, 453–55 (2010) (asserting the full copyrights of young authors and commenting on the dangers they 
face from online clickwrap agreements to involuntarily give up copyrights, citing iParadigms as an 
example).   
 168. iParadigms, 562 F.3d at 634 (“The Turnitin system gives participating schools the option of 
‘archiving’ the student works.  When this option is selected, Turnitin digitally stores the written works 
submitted by students ‘so that the work becomes part of the database used by Turnitin to evaluate the 
originality of other student’s works in the future.’”).  
 169. Answers to Questions Students Ask About Turnitin, TURNITIN, http://perma.cc/8S2F-VG9B 
(last visited Nov. 21, 2014). 
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Turnitin’s claim that its archive constitutes a fair use of student papers.170  
Specifically, against the claim that archiving student papers advances an 
educational purpose under factor one, the plaintiffs in iParadigms argued that 
Turnitin was making commercial use of student works.171  Since Turnitin collects 
fees from participating schools and does not add any new content when archiving 
student works, the plaintiffs argued that factor one should weigh against a finding 
of fair use for Turnitin.172 
In 2008, the district court granted summary judgment in Turnitin’s favor, 
finding that Turnitin made fair use of the students’ works.  On appeal, the Fourth 
Circuit favorably cited the district court’s fair use analysis.173  Acknowledging that 
Turnitin “intend[ed] to profit from its use of the student works,”174 the Fourth 
Circuit nonetheless found factor one to weigh strongly in favor of Turnitin.  The 
court did not ascribe the educational purpose of the schools onto Turnitin, but 
emphasized the affiliation between the service provider and the schools in finding 
“highly transformative” use.175  And because Turnitin “provides a substantial 
public benefit through the network of educational institutions using Turnitin,” the 
interests under factor one weighed so much in favor of Turnitin as to offset all other 
factors, including the students’ interest in future uses of their work.176 
 
 170. See, e.g., TyAnna K. Herrington, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ON CAMPUS:  STUDENTS’ RIGHTS 
AND RESPONSIBILITIES 92–100 (2010) (listing alternative anti-plagiarism methods that educators have 
proposed to services like Turnitin, and discussing why these services “may not well serve the interests of 
educators who use them and how their use could be both unethical and infringing of students’ work”). 
 171. Id.  Courts have relied heavily on a presumption of non-fair use when confronted with a 
commercial use, established in Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 
(1984).  This presumption has since been overturned.  Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 
569 (1993) (holding that while defendant’s commercial use disfavors a finding of fair use, the overall 
transformative nature of defendant’s derivative song may still weigh factor one in favor of defendant).  
Although no longer outcome-determinative, courts still weigh commercial use against a finding of fair 
use under the factor one analysis.  See, e.g., Basic Books v. Kinko’s Graphics Co., 758 F. Supp. 1531 
(S.D.N.Y. 1991). 
 172. A.V. v. iParadigms, LLC, 544 F. Supp. 2d 473 (E.D. Va. 2008); see also Am. Geophysical 
Union v. Texaco, Inc., 60 F.3d 913 (2d Cir. 1995) (finding that archiving of scientific articles by 
researchers at Texaco was not a transformative purpose and not fair use). 
 173. iParadigms, 562 F.3d at 638.  
 174. Id. 
 175. Id. at 638–40. 
 176. Id. at 638–44 (“[T]o the extent that [Turnitin’s] use would adversely affect plaintiffs’ works 
in this particular market, we must consider the transformative nature of the use.”).  The Fourth Circuit’s 
treatment of factor four is not entirely clear, but it seems to indicate that the students’ interests in their 
works—either through selling their works or submitting them as writing samples—would have weighed 
against a finding of fair use.  Id. at 644–45.  The court postulated that Turnitin’s archival of student 
papers would impair the high school student market for unpublished term papers and essays.  Id.  
However, the court justified its finding of fair use by describing the market harm as a permissible 
suppression.  Id.; see also Campbell, 510 U.S. at 598 (holding market suppression as permissible under 
fair use).  In addition, the Fourth Circuit implied in iParadigms that students waived the factor four 
argument by testifying that they would not sell their works.  562 F.3d at 644.  As for the students’ 
argument regarding writing samples, the court simply stated that educators who review writing samples 
would know to expect a previous student work and understand that it could be archived on Turnitin.  See 
id. at 645. 
The court all but dismissed the students’ arguments under factors two and three.  On factor two, the 
court conceded that the student works might be highly creative, but ruled that Turnitin’s use was not 
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The Turnitin decision came as a surprise because courts have explicitly declined 
to find archival a transformative use.177  When we consider the Second Circuit’s 
decision in American Geophysical Union v. Texaco,178 the Fourth Circuit’s finding 
of a “highly transformative” purpose in the mere archival of copyrighted work in 
iParadigms comes as a surprise.179  Like Turnitin, Texaco archived copyrighted 
writings for future use without contributing new content or seeking permission 
from rights holders.  The rights holders in Amercian Geophysical Union, publishers 
of scientific and technical journals, sued Texaco.180  In American Geophysical 
Union, the Second Circuit ruled in the rights holders’ favor on almost every factor 
even though it found a thinner copyright interest in the fact-based articles at 
issue.181  The most convincing way to square Turnitin’s success and Texaco’s 
failure is to distinguish based on the alleged rights-violator.182  Texaco’s 
commercial interest in archiving was determinative for the factor one analysis.183  
In contrast, because schools requested Turnitin to carry out part of their educational 
mission, Turnitin won under factor one despite having a commercial interest in 
archiving student works.184 
2.  Coursepacks Could Be Fairly Reproduced by Universities but Not By Copy 
Shops 
The identity of the alleged rights-violator has also driven fair use analyses in 
cases involving the unauthorized reproduction of educational materials in school 
coursepacks.  In the coursepacks cases, whether the alleged rights-violator was 
affiliated with the school has mattered more to courts than whether the rights holder 
was a student or a professional.  In Basic Books, the first in this line of cases, 
Kinko’s failed to convince the court that its coursepacks constituted an educational 
use of copyrighted materials.185  The Basic Books Court concluded that students 
 
related to the creative core since it only compared similarities between student works.  See id. at 640–42.  
Under factor three, while the court agreed that Turnitin used the entirety of each student work it 
archived, it held that archiving the whole work was appropriately limited to the service’s electronic 
comparison purposes.  See id. at 642. 
 177. See H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 66–72 (1976) (providing guidance on valid educational 
purpose under § 107). 
 178. Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco, Inc., 60 F.3d 913 (2d Cir. 1994).  
 179. iParadigms, 562 F.3d at 638–40.  Also, student works tend to be more expressive and less 
fact-driven, and thus closer to the core of copyright.  See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 586 (finding “creative 
expression” is at the “core” of copyright protection under factor two). 
 180. See Am. Geophysical Union, 60 F.3d at 915.  
 181. Id. at 925 (weighing factor two against the copyright holders, since the articles were mostly 
factual and therefore outside the core of copyright protection). 
 182. The Second Circuit held that Texaco could have easily acquired a license through a copyright 
clearance center.  Id. at 929.  The fourth fair use factor requires a showing of the rights holders’ market 
harm, and the loss of licensing fees in Am. Geophysical Union satisfied the requisite showing.  Id. at 
929–31.  It would have been just as easy for Turnitin to obtain student permission through a Clickwrap 
Agreement, though. 
 183. See Am. Geophysical Union, 60 F.3d at 922–23 (finding that Texaco had not archived the 
works in order to generate profits, but rather to avoid paying a licensing fee).  
 184. See supra note 168 and accompanying text. 
 185. Basic Books, Inc. v. Kinko’s Graphics Co., 758 F. Supp. 1522, 1547 (S.D.N.Y. 1991). 
HU, A SHIELD DOES NOT FALL IN HAZELWOOD, 38 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 207 (2015)  
2015] A SHIELD DOES NOT FALL IN HAZELWOOD 231 
could “no doubt” assert an educational use for the coursepacks, but Kinko’s 
employees could not.186  After Basic Books, other non-school-affiliated copy shops 
have asserted educational use without success.187  These cases left open the 
question of whether an educator or school could make fair use of copyrighted 
materials in educational coursepacks.188 
Teachers and schools now have the technology to make and distribute 
coursepacks without using a print shop.  In a 2012 opinion from the Northern 
District of Georgia, Cambridge University Press v. Becker, the court found fair use 
in coursepacks that were copied and distributed by a university.189  In Cambridge 
University Press, various book publishers sued Georgia State University officials 
for promulgating policies that materially contributed to the creation and distribution 
of allegedly infringing coursepacks over the university’s servers.190  The university 
defended its faculty’s use of copyrighted materials, asserting fair use and other 
theories.191  In the forty-eight instances of alleged infringement where the 
university’s sole defense was fair use, the district court found all but five to be fair 
use.192  In those five instances, although factor one strongly favored the university, 
the harm to rights holders’ interests was so substantial that it outweighed the 
educational purpose of the school’s use.193  The district court’s decision reveals that 
while courts are unwilling to allow non-school-affiliate third parties to usurp the 
educational use claims of a student,194 a judge might presume the validity of a 
school’s educational use claim.195 
Discussing why factor one so “strongly favor[ed]” the school, the district court 
noted that “the facts of this case so clearly meet the criteria of (1) the preamble to 
fair use factor one, (2) factor one itself and because (3) Georgia State is a nonprofit 
 
 186. Id.  
 187. See, e.g., Princeton Univ. Press v. Mich. Document Servs., Inc., 99 F.3d 1381, 1388–89 (6th 
Cir. 1996) (en banc).  The defendant in Michigan Document Services attempted the same argument that 
Kinko’s made in Basic Books, asserting that the coursepacks were educational and fell under fair use.  
Though in a different circuit, the argument fared no better. 
 188. Basic Books, 758 F. Supp.  at 1531 (suggesting that students can “no doubt” assert an 
educational use of the coursepacks).  
 189. Cambridge Univ. Press v. Becker (Cambridge Univ. Press I), 863 F. Supp. 2d 1190, 1210 
(N.D. Ga. 2012). 
 190. Id. at 1201–05. 
 191. Id. 
 192. Seventy-four instances of alleged contributory infringement survived summary judgment.  
See David Kluft, The Devil’s in the Details:  Dissecting the 350-Page Georgia State University 
Electronic Reserve Copyright Ruling, TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT L. BLOG (May 23, 2012), 
http://perma.cc/P68-J8K2.  Ultimately, sixteen claims were denied for plaintiffs’ failure to establish 
copyright ownership, and ten claims were denied as de minimis.  Id. 
 193. Id. 
 194. Princeton Univ. Press v. Mich. Document Servs., Inc., 99 F.3d 1381, 1389 (6th Cir. 1996) (en 
banc)  (noting that courts have “‘properly rejected attempts by for-profit users to stand in the shoes’” of 
customers who do make educational and noncommercial uses (emphasis added) (quoting William F. 
Patry, FAIR USE IN COPYRIGHT LAW 420 n.34)).  
 195. Cambridge Univ. Press I, 863 F. Supp. 2d at 1224 (“Basic Books and Michigan Document 
Services involved commercial copiers that produced printed coursepacks and sought unsuccessfully to 
characterize their use of copyrighted materials as noncommercial, nonprofit uses.”); see also Cambridge 
Univ. Press v. Patton (Cambridge Univ. Press II), 769 F.3d 1232, 1264 (11th Cir. 2014) (same). 
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educational institution.”196  On October 17, 2014, the Eleventh Circuit reversed the 
district court’s ruling for its overly mechanical application of the fair use factors on 
whole.197  However, the circuit court agreed with the district court’s analysis under 
factor one that unauthorized copying of educational materials by a school requires a 
different fair use analysis than the exact same kind of copying by a commercial 
print shop.198  Echoing the words of the district court, the Eleventh Circuit 
contrasted the Georgia State University coursepacks program with previous cases, 
where “the court refused to allow the defendants, who were engaged in commercial 
operations, to stand in the shoes of students and professors in claiming that their 
making of multiple copies of scholarly works was for nonprofit educational 
purposes.”199 
The coursepacks cases provide an up-to-date illustration of the difference 
between courts’ treatment of schools and of non-school-affiliated parties.  In both 
the archival and the coursepacks cases, schools and school-affiliated defendants 
fared better with the educational purpose argument than did unaffiliated parties that 
made similar secondary use of copyrighted works.  The school-affiliated Turnitin 
won on the issue of fair use based on the educational purpose of its services, but 
American Geophysical Union and the coursepacks cases suggest that, without the 
school policies that authorized Turnitin’s archival of student works, a commercial 
company could not have pierced the high school students’ copyright protections.  
Furthermore, the coursepacks cases highlight the degree of judicial deference to 
school policies even when the legal rights of non-student writers are implicated, 
since some judges are willing to turn the tide of precedent when schools are at 
bar.200  Considering the extraordinary judicial deference underscoring the decisions 
that have involved a school as the alleged rights-violator, student reporters should 
possess all the First Amendment protections of full-fledged professionals against 
non-school-affiliated subpoenaing parties, Hazelwood notwithstanding. 
IV.  STRENGTHENING STUDENT ACCESS TO FIRST AMENDMENT 
PRIVILEGE THROUGH SHIELD LAWS 
Hazelwood does not bar courts from applying the framework of professional 
reporters’ First Amendment privilege to high school student reporters.  It is 
unlikely that the Supreme Court will decide the issue of a First Amendment high 
school reporter’s privilege anytime soon.  While lower courts have made headway 
on the coverage question of a First Amendment reporter’s privilege, they have 
failed to provide guidelines that offer predictable outcomes for non-traditional 
newsgatherers such as high school student reporters.201  Legislative guidance could 
 
 196. Cambridge Univ. Press I, 863 F. Supp. 2d at 1224. 
 197. Cambridge Univ. Press II, 769 F.3d at 1260. 
 198. Id. at 1263–67. 
 199. Id. at 1264. 
 200. See Cambridge Univ. Press I, 863 F. Supp. 2d at 1239 (finding that a university permissibly 
uses copyrighted materials unless it has caused substantial economic harm to the copyright holders).  
 201. See Persky v. Yeshiva Univ., No. 01 Civ. 5278 (LMM), 2002 WL 31769704 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 
10, 2002) (privileging undergraduate student journalist); Blum v. Schlegel, 150 F.R.D. 42 (W.D.N.Y. 
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provide much-needed clarification on the privilege’s coverage, just as copyright 
statutes have clarified the scope of the Intellectual Property Clause.  Legislators 
should make careful drafting choices to avoid under-protecting the rights of high 
school student reporters, especially student reporters who conduct newsgathering at 
near-professional levels. 
Over the last several years, Congress has seen numerous proposals for a federal 
shield law.202  Many of these proposals would exclude high school and college 
student reporters by making professional employment a threshold requirement.203  
The most recent Congressional proposal—the “Free Flow of Information Act”—
was amended after journalists demanded stronger press protections.204  It now 
reserves a niche for student reporters in its three-tier definition of “covered 
journalists.”205  The first tier covers traditional, salaried journalists who gathered 
the subpoenaed material with intent of public dissemination.206  The second tier 
covers career freelancers, former employees of a “news dissemination service” or 
participants on journalistic media at an “institution of higher education.”207  The 
final, catchall tier gives judges the discretion to privilege individuals who are not 
covered under the first two tiers when it “would be in the interest of justice and 
necessary to protect lawful and legitimate news-gathering activities.”208  The third 
tier seems coterminous with the scope of a qualified constitutional reporter’s 
 
1993) (privileging law school student).  However, college and high school students might not be 
similarly situated with respect to the First Amendment.  See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. 
of Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995) (finding university’s denial of printing funds to school-sponsored 
publication with Christian editorial viewpoint impermissible under First Amendment and not justified by 
the school’s scarcity of funds for all educational needs); Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 
260, 273 n.7 (1988) (declining to decide “whether the same degree of deference is appropriate with 
respect to school-sponsored expressive activities at the college and university level”).  But see Hosty v. 
Carter, 412 F.3d 731, 739 (7th Cir. 2005) (applying Hazelwood and holding that a university could 
conduct prior review of its newspaper). 
 202. Free Flow of Information Act of 2013, H.R. 1962, 113th Cong. (2013); Free Flow of 
Information Act of 2013, S. 987, 113th Cong. (2013); Free Flow of Information Act of 2007, H.R. 2102, 
110th Cong. (2007).  None of these proposals were ever enacted.  The Free Flow of Information Act of 
2007 was passed by the House but was subsequently filibustered in the Senate. 
 203. WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 18. 
 204. Members of the press criticized an earlier draft of the 2013 bill for under-protecting 
journalists.  See, e.g., Obama’s Media Shield Law Makes Prosecuting Journalists Even Easier, RUSSIA 
TODAY (May 17, 2013, 9:16PM), http://perma.cc/F9XK-MKKJ (“[T]here’s a strong argument that 
passing the bill . . . will weaken rights reporters already have and make it easier for the government to 
get sources from reporters.”).  The bill was amended in September 2013 to strengthen protections; the 
amendment passed the Senate on September 12, 2013.  On November 6, 2013, the bill placed on the 
Senate Legislative Calendar, and has not seen any action since then.  S. 987, 113th Cong. (2013–14), 
available at http://perma.cc/NE7T-TWVU.  
 205. Free Flow of Information Act of 2013, S. Rep. No. 113-118, at 14 (2013).  
 206. S. 987, 113th Cong. § 11(1)(A)(i) (as reported to the Senate, Nov. 6, 2013), available at 
http://perma.cc/FY7W-NQTW (defining a “covered journalist” as an employee, agent or independent 
contractor for a news dissemination service, and whose primary intent for investigating an event was, at 
the inception, to procure information for dissemination).  The first tier definition mimics the narrow 
definition of covered persons in the Delaware statute.  DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, §§ 4320–26 (2014). 
 207. S. 987 § 11(1)(A)(ii). 
 208. Id. § 11(1)(B). 
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privilege, 209 and would therefore strengthen a claim of constitutional privilege for 
student reporters. 
If the current federal shield bill does become the first federal shield law in the 
United States, it would only protect reporters in a narrow set of circumstances—
subpoenas issued by a federal actor and arising out of federal causes of action.210  A 
student-friendly state shield law would strengthen privilege in both state and 
federal cases, since federal courts look to state law for definitions of privileged 
persons.211  West Virginia, the latest state to enact a reporter’s shield law, provides 
a two-tier definition of privileged persons that is similar to the definition in the 
proposed Free Flow of Information Act.212  While the first tier requires the reporter 
to earn a “substantial livelihood” from newsgathering, the second tier allows judges 
to protect student reporters whose work closely models traditional journalism.213  
Shield laws like the federal bill and the West Virginia statute protect a narrow core 
of traditional press, but provide a catchall category that gives judges discretion to 
award privilege to non-traditional reporters based on whether the reporters 
conducted legitimate journalism and the interest of justice in the subpoenaed 
material. 
This type of shield law would give judges the flexibility to withhold the 
privilege from leakers, sham newsmen and cyberbullies.  At the same time, because 
the inquiry focuses on the newsgatherer’s process and product rather than 
employment status or income, this type of shield law extends protection to student 
reporters whose work resembles the work of professional journalists.  Wide 
adoption of such state shield laws would increase a high school student reporter’s 
chances of succeeding on her privilege claim in jurisdictions that do not recognize a 
constitutional reporter’s privilege, as well as in jurisdictions that would not clearly 
cover student reporters under the constitutional privilege.  The greater likelihood of 
receiving a reporter’s privilege would allow young student reporters to continue 
engaging in high-caliber investigative reporting, reducing the double-bind of 
risking imprisonment if they protect sources and social stigma if they snitch. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
High school student reporters advance many of the same First Amendment 
interests as their professional counterparts.  In addition, high school press provides 
information to an underserved community and builds courageous individuals who 
will shape the future of professional journalism.  While it is not certain that a First 
 
 209. See, e.g., N.Y. Times Co. v. Gonzales, 459 F.3d 160, 175 (2d Cir. 2006) (favorably citing 
Department of Justice guidelines stating that “the approach in every case must be to strike the proper 
balance between the public’s interest in the free dissemination of ideas and information and the public’s 
interest in effective law enforcement and the fair administration of justice”). 
 210. The Free Flow of Information Act does not preempt state law.  See S. 987 § 2 (limiting 
privilege to subpoenas before a “federal entity”). 
 211. See supra notes 73–74 (discussing Federal Rule of Evidence 501 and federal courts’ 
deference to state definitions of covered journalists). 
 212. See W. VA. CODE § 57-3-10 (LexisNexis 2012). 
 213. Id.   
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Amendment privilege exists in all jurisdictions, high school student reporters 
deserve a First Amendment privilege in the jurisdictions where the privilege would 
be available to a professional reporter, notwithstanding First Amendment speech 
cases like Hazelwood.  Courts should recognize the advanced newsgathering that 
many high school journalists conduct, as well as the stakes involved if student 
reporters do not receive First Amendment protection from non-school-affiliated 
parties.  Legislatures should also seriously consider adopting more student-friendly 
shield laws to secure the privilege for high school students who are committed to 
conducting legitimate journalism. 
